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Introductory remarks
The quantifier is one of the crucial concepts in modern logic. However, for a long time the only quantifiers considered were the existential (3) and universal (V) ones. The first general concept of a quantifier was proposed by Andrzej Mostowski, later generalized by P. Lindstrom. Both definitions accept as quantifiers a lot of concepts which we are accustomed to treat in a very different way. Probably one of the most natural concepts of quantifier not covered by traditional theory was suggested by L. Henkin.
Henkin [6] proposed to consider a language with quantifiers arising from existential and universal quantifiers by writing them down in some orderings (i.e., dense ordering, partial ordering etc.). He called them dependent quantifiers. As simplest example, he considered a quantifier H bounding four variables in a formula. A formula # built up using H can be written as:
Its semantical meaning can be explained as If, g Vx, y $(x, y, fx, gy). It was proved (see Henkin [6] ) by Ehrenfeucht that the logic L(H) is essentially stronger than first-order logic and the set of tautologies of L(H) is not recursively enumerable. About ten years later Enderton [5] and Walkoe [16] considered logic with quantifiers proposed by Henkin but bounding finitely many variables only. They call them 'finitely partially ordered quantifiers' (f.p.0.q.). Instead of this name we shall use the term 'Henkin quantifiers'. In the literature also the names 'branched quantifiers' or, in a little broader sense, 'branching quantifiers' are used.
After the two eminent results of Godel that elementary logic is recursively enumerable and that no theory rich enough to contain arithmetic could be recursively enumerable, and Church's theorem that elementary logic is not decidable, we have two important borderlines dividing logics and theories into three classes:
1. decidable, 2. undecidable but recursively axiomatizable, 3 . not recursively axiomatizable. Traditionally the majority of efforts were devoted to identifying the borderline between decidable and undecidable. However, the second borderline seems also to be very important. A recursively enumerable theory can be axiomatized in a standard way, hence its set of theorems can be defined by proof-theoretical means only, not referring to any semantical description.
The main purpose of this paper is to draw as accurate as possible the borderline between decidable and undecidable theories in languages with Henkin quantifiers.
We state two theorems contrasting undecidability of some simple fragment of logic with empty signature in a language with Henkin quantifiers on the one hand, with decidability of a similar fragment with function quantifiers, being apparently an inessential weakening of Henkin quantifiers, on the other hand.
Researches and results presented in this paper are strictly related to those from , where some rough borderlines between decidable and undecidable fragments of L(H) were drawn. Here we give a more detailed description of this borderline, from two sides-positive and negative-f decidability cases.
The main part of this paper is divided into two parts (Sections 2 and 3). In Section 2 the theory of equality is discussed. Section 3 is devoted to investigations of decidability problems for some theories of nonempty signature.
Basic concepts
Formally a Henkin quantifier prefix can be defined as Q = (Ae, E,, De), where A, and E, are disjoint sets of variables (universal and existential, respectively), and Do E A, X E, (De is a dependency relation, it says on which universal variables a given existential variable depends). Q bounds those variables which belong to A, U E,. We differentiate between quantifiers and quantifier prefixes as follows: a quantifier prefix is a quantifier with assigned concrete variables. For instance V is a quantifier, but Vx is a quantifier prefix. In this sense we have defined Henkin quantifier prefixes, not Henkin quantifiers. However, this definition can be modified in a natural way to apply it to Henkin quantifiers also. We will use a somewhat ambiguous notation and terminology not differentiating between quantifiers and quantifier prefixes if it will be safe enough.
Semantics for Henkin quantifiers is given through translation into second-order logic. A formula Q@(x,, . . . , xn, y,, . . . , y,), where x,, . . . , x, are all universal variables of Q and yl, . . . , y,,, are all existential variables from Q, is translated into a formula % * * * 3fm vx, . . * vx, t($(x*, . . . , x,9 f&)2 . . . > fmGm))h where Xi is a sequence of variables being in relation D, with yi (or in other words on which yi depends). In what follows we will use a more intuitive notation introduced by Henkin. Instead of ({x, y}, {z, u}, {(x, z), (y, u)}) we shall write vx 32
Even if not all Henkin quantifiers can be written in this more intuitive way, this is no problem since we shall consider here only quantifiers having such intuitive representations.
We assume the following notation: Hf: is the quantifier vx,, . . * V-xlk BY, . . .
:. vx,, * * * VGZk 3Y, By default k = 1, n =2-which means that H, is HA, and Hk is Hz, and in particular H is Hl (it is so-called the Henkin quantifier). By L(Hi) we mean the logic with Hfl as the only quantifier. L(H,) is the logic with all quantifiers H,. By L* we denote the logic with all Henkin quantifiers.
In the paper by Walkoe [16] two important normal form characterizations for Henkin quantifiers were shown. He proved: It follows that using quantifiers of the form Q ' we can define all Henkin quantifier prefixes.
It is not known whether prefixes of the form Q" are sufficient without the restriction to infinite models, or if the semantical power of prefixes of the form H, is sufficient.
The logic with Henkin quantifiers is stronger than that of elementary logic. The first known sentence with a Henkin quantifier not expressible in elementary logic is the so-called Ehrenfeucht statement: It says that the universe is finite. Translated into second-order logic it says exactly what follows: it is not so that there is a one-one function and an object which is different from all values of this function. The equivalence (x = y e z = U) is used here to express two things: that two functions are identical (implication from left to right), and that this function is one-one (implication from right to left). It follows that the Ehrenfeucht statement can be expressed using a weaker quantifier, a so-called function quantifier. Function quantifiers were introduced in Krynicki [S] and studied in Krynicki-Vatinanen [lo] . The function quantifier F, binds 2n variables in one formula and its semantics is defined as follows It is known that L(F,) is a sublogic of L(H,). (F,x, . . .x,,y, * . . y,) @(xl, . . . , x,, y,, . . ., y,,) is equivalent to (H,xl.. *xnyl.. .Y,)(cK A @(x1, . . . , xnry,, . . . , y,)), where (Y is a conjunction of formulae (x, =xi + y, =yi) for i = 2, . . . , n. By L(F,) we denote the logic with all quantifiers F,. The concept of function quantifier can be generalized in a natural way. So Fk, is a function quantifier, where n is the number of tokens of the function used, and k is its arity (Ff: binds k(n + 1) variables).
Thus for instance (F;~,GYIYZZ,ZJ  44x1, ~2, ~1, ~29 ~1, ,721 is equivalent to
To compare logics we use the relation s defined as follows: L < L' if and only if for every L-formula $ there is an L'-formula 111 such that for every structure of We follow more or less the standard notation, as in Chang-Keisler [2] . By f"(a)
we denote the result of n-fold application of f to a (i.e., f"(a) = a, f"+'(a) =f(f"(a))).
Theory of equality
Firstsrder formulation of the word problem
Let A* be the set of words over the alphabet A = {a, b}. The word problem for semigroups can be formulated as the decision problem for sentences of the form a!, =p1 A * * ' A WI = Pn * a;t+1= hz+,t
where ai, pi E A* for i = 1, 2, . . . , n + 1. That is, as the problem of deciding if a sentence of the form (1) is true in every semigroup with two generators a, b. It is well known that this problem is undecidable. In Davis [3] this problem is formulated in a slightly more general way. The difference is that he allows any finite alphabet A. However, from an algorithmic point of view both formulations are equivalent.
Let L be a first-order logic with identity and two unary function symbols f, g as only nonlogical constants. Let T[x] be the set of all terms of logic L with x as unique free variable. Let S be the set of all sentences of the form:
where s;(x), t;(x) E T[x] for i = 1, 2, . . . , n + 1. By the tautology problem for the set S we mean the problem of deciding if a given sentence belonging to the set S is true in every model for L.
Lemma 1. The tautology problem for the set S is undecidable.
Proof. We shall show that the word problem can be recursively reduced to the decision problem for the set S.
Let us observe that there is a one-one effective correspondence ~1 between the set A* and T[x] such that P(E) = x (E is the empty word) and for (Y E A*, la4 =fM4) and p(k) = g@(a)).
Each model '?I = (X, F, G) for L determines a semigroup H of mappings from X to X generated by F and G. Moreover, for any semigroup H with two generators there is a model '3 for L such that for every (Y, /3 E A* we have:
(Y = /3 is true in H if and only if 5!l k Vx (~(a) = p(p)).
Then the implication (1) is true in every semigroup with two generators exactly when the sentence:
is true in every model for L. Cl
Let W be the set of all sentences of the logic L of the form Vx By, . . . By, @, where 4 is a boolean combination of formulae of the form f(z) = u and g(z) = u, where z, u E {x, y,, . . . , y,}.
Lemma 2. The tautology problem for W is undecidable.
Proof. We are going to reduce the decision problem for S to that of W. Let us observe that the sentence (2) is equivalent to a sentence of the form Vx 3y @, where C$ is a quantifier-free formula. Then we can eliminate all complex terms from any quantifier-free formula 77 subsequently replacing r](f (s)) by 32 (z = s A q(f (z))), where z is a new variable not occurring in 17. In this way we effectively obtain a formula belonging to W and equivalent to (2). 0
Undecidability of the theory of equality in L(H,)
Let $ be a sentence of the form Vz, 32, . . .3z, t), where q is a boolean combination of formulae of the form f(z) = v and g(z) = v, where z, u E { zo, z1, -. . 9 z,} (it means $ E W). By $* we denote the following sentence Vx, 3Y, . . . . . . where 5' is the conjunction (x1 = x2 3 y, = y2) A . . . A (x, =x, 3 y, = y,), 5 is the conjunction (ui = u2 * vi = v2) A . * . A (u, = uk 3 v1 = vk), q' is the negation of the formula obtained from r/j by substitutions yi in place of the ith occurrence off in q, vi in place of the ith occurrence of g in ly, x is the conjunction of equalities xi = zj and Ui = 4, when the ith occurrence off in + is in a context f (zj), and the ith occurrence of g in I@ is in a context g(zj) (of course m and k are the numbers of occurrences in w off and g, respectively).
The described construction is very similar to that of Walkoe [16] and Enderton [5] . The point here is that to formulate t/~,' we do not need all Henkin quantifiers but only the quantifiers H,.
A semantical analysis of sentences 4 and $* proves the following. Let V be the set of sentences of the form lQ$, where Q is a Henkin quantifier prefix and $I is a purely logical (i.e., without nonlogical constants) quantifier-free formula. V, is the subset of formulae ~Qc#J from V such that Q is H, for some it.
Lemma 4. The tautology problem for the set V is recursively enumerable.
Proof. Let g E V.
This means that C is of the form lQ@, where C$ is quantifier-free. Then we can translate 5' into a second-order statement in the usual way. Let VfI --* Vfn II, be the second-order translation of lQ$. According to our assumption t& can be identified with a first-order formula when we treat the second-order variables fi, . . . , fn as nonlogical constants. Then we see that 5 is a tautology if and only if t/j is a first-order tautology. Then we obtain the claim by the recursive enumerability of the set of first-order tautologies. 0 Proof. Recursive enumerability follows from Lemma 4. By Lemmas 2 and 3 the tautology problem for the set V, cannot be decidable. 0
It does not follow that the theory of equality in L(H,) is axiomatizable (i.e., the set of its theorems is recursively enumerable).
Let us notice that the implication (1) does not hold in all semigroups if and only if there is a semigroup of functions over an infinite set with two generators in which the implication (1) does not hold. Thus we have justified the following: Let W-be the set of negations of formulae from W, that is, the set of sentences from logic L of the form 3x Vyi . * . Vyn @, where C#I is a boolean combination of formulae of the form f(z) = v and g(z) = v, where z, v E G, Y1> . * . 7 Yn>.
Lemma 6. The problem whether q E W-has an infinite model is not recursively enumerable.
Proof. The reasoning is similar to that in the proof of Lemma 2. We use here the fact that the problem whether implication
(1) does not hold in all semigroups is not recursively enumerable, being the complement of a recursively enumerable but not recursive problem.
•! Let C$ E W-. We define 6 as the sentence (y J +*), where c$* is defined by (3) and y is Ehrenfeucht's statement saying that there are finitely many entities. By semantical analysis of 4 we obtain the following:
Lemma 7. For @ E W-we have: @ has an infinite model if and only if 4 is a tautology.
Now we get the conclusion.
Theorem 3. The theory of equality in L(H,) is neither decidable nor axiomatizable.
Proof. By Lemmas 6, 7, the considered set has a recursively defined subset which is not recursively enumerable. By Theorem 2 it also has a recursively defined subset which is recusively enumerable but not recursive.
•I
Bifunctional quantifiers
In the above reasoning justifying the last theorem we have used a fragment of the logic L(H,).
This suggests us to introduce the quantifier F,., defined as 
As a corollary of our considerations we have:
The theory of equality in L(Fw,rU) is neither decidable nor axiomatizable.
The proof system LB
In Mostowski [12] the proof system LB for logic with Henkin quantifiers is defined by two rules in natural deduction style LBl, LB2. It was proved that LB is complete with respect to the so-called weak semantics, defined by the class of structures (3, K), where %?l is a first-order structure, and K is a class of relations over 1'211 closed under definability in (3, K) by LB-formulae.
Satisfiability is given through a translation t of LB-formulae into second-order formulae restricting second-order quantifiers to K. Thus
as 3R, S E K (t(QR(Z)) A t(Q'S(j)) A VZ, jj (R(x) A S(y) j t(q)))
, where x and jj are sequences of all variables occurring in Q and Q', respectively. Assuming the Axiom of Choice we obtain by removing the restriction to a class K, a semantics equivalent to that given by Henkin and assumed elsewhere in this paper.
Of course the set of LB-tautologies is recursively enumerable, as is true of all finitary proof systems. However, we can justify an analogy of Theorem 2 for LB. For this we need the following:
Lemma 8. For every $ E V, $ is a tautology if and only if $ is LB-provable.
In Mostowski [14] there was proved a more general theorem for $ having only negative occurrences of quantifier prefixes. The idea of that proof is similar to that used in the proof of Lemma 4.
By Theorem 2 and Lemma 8 we obtain the following:
Theorem 5. The set of LB-tautologies belonging to r/;, is not recursive.
A logic with one Henkin quantifier
In Mostowski [13] the strongest known negative result concerning the decidability of the theory of equality in a language with fixed Henkin quantifier is stated. Unfortunately the formulation of the last theorem in that paper stating the relevant fact is incorrect. The correct formulation is as follows. The proof in Mostowski [13] gives a correct justification for this theorem. Furthermore the assumption about finite axiomatizability is not essential.
Decidability of the theory of equality in L(F,)
In this section, in spite of the main result of Section 2.3, we are going to show that the theory of equality is decidable in the language L(F,). This result should be less surprising if we consider the following example. In Section 2.2 we have reduced the word problem to the tautology problem of sentences of the form ~H,,c#J where 4 is a first-order formula. Then we have concluded the undecidability of this problem. Now let us consider the class of sentences of the form lF,X # where I$ is a first-order formula. It follows from the Ehrenfeucht theorem [4] concerning decidability of the first-order theory of one unary function that the tautology problem for the last class of sentences is decidable. Now we start to prove our main result in this section. The proof will be done by the method of elimination of quantifiers, similar to that used in . Thus we will consider a formula F,x, . * * x, #, where C$ is a quantifier-free formula and we shall show that it can be equivalently replaced by some quantifier-free formula using some, so-called, basic sentences. To do this we shall classify all possible unary functions with respect to their properties expressed by quantifier-free formulas. Thus we will consider structure of the form
where al, . . . , a, E A, ai # aj for i #j and f is a function from A to A. We begin with defining a type of n elements of such a model. It describes all equality relations between given elements and their images in the function f. Next we will introduce the notion of l-basic type which describes possible neighbours of a given element in the graph of a function. This allows us to define the notion of code. A code is in some sense the 'skeleton' of a function-it contains all possible configurations of the graph of a given function. We will show that there are finitely many codes and that each function corresponds to some code. This allows us to consider only finitely many sorts of functions and to effectively determine these sorts of functions which satisfy a starting formula $. Finally, it suffices to associate with each code a suitable basic sentence which guarantees the existence of a function of a given sort.
By a type of elements bl, . . . , b, EA in a structure 8, denoted by t"(bl, . . . , b,), we mean a pair (E, r]) where E is a function from the set Thus the type t"(bl, . . . , b,) describes the graph of the function f restricted to the elements bl, . . . , b,, f(b,), . . . , f (b,) . Moreover, this description is com-plete. It means that if two graphs are not isomorphic then their types are not the same (however, not conversely). Thus with each type t we can associate a unique, up to isomorphism, directed graph G,. Moreover, for each type t a quantifier-free formula c#&~, . . . , x,) can effectively be found such that for 8 iff tY'(bI, . . . , b,) = t.  A type t is called connected if G, is a connected graph (i.e., for all elements  a, b of the graph there is a sequence a,, . . . , a, such that a, = a, a, = b and for all i=l,..., s -1 there is an arrow from ui to Ui+r or from u,+~ to UJ. A type t = (E, 7) is called simple if for all i, j such that 0 < i < j s 2n we have: 2. P is a set of basic l-types on D such that the following conditions are satisfied:
-for each d E D and I s IZ there is p E P which contains a formula "x =f'(d)"; -if p E P is subtrivial but not trivial, then for some d E D "f(x) = d" EP; -if p E P is not trivial and t is ramifying, then 8, $p; -if p E P is exciting, then the following conditions are satisfied: -for simple type t, Of Ep, -for all initial and ramifying in wider sense types t, 8, $p, -for every d E D and k = 1, . . . , n, "fk(x) = d" $p; -if p E P is not trivial and for some type t, 8, EP, then there is a trivial l-type pr such that 8, EP'; -if for some r = 1, . . . , n there is an r-cycle in P which is not trivial, then the set {d E D: a trivial type p such that "x = d" EP is an r-cycle} has at least n elements; -the set of sentences { a(~,): a(x) EP E P}, where {c,: p E P} is a set of new distinct constants, is consistent. 3. Q G {p E P: p is subtrivial and not trivial}. Let %= (A,a,,. . . ,a,, f) be a structure of the form (4) and let c = (D,d,,..., d,, P, Q, F, f *) be a code. As follows from the definition of code, for each d E D there is exactly one l-type p E P such that p contains a formula "x = d". We will denote this l-type byp,. Let 6 be the function defined for d E D as follows: 6(d) =pd. We say that $2 admits c if there exists a function E from P to A such that the following conditions are satisfied, where E and 6 denote also the induced translations of a basic l-type:
1. {p:p is a basic l-type on ES(D) realized in %?l} = &6(P).
Each p E ES(Q) is realized exactly F(6-'(E-'(P)))
times in 8. Each subtrivial but not trivial l-type on &i(D) belonging to GS(P -Q) is realized at least n times in 2L 3. Ef*E-' Cf f-l (E(p))*.
For each p E P, E(P) realizes d(p)
in '21.
Lemma 9. For every structure 'u = (A, a,, . . . , a,,, , f) there is a function g and a code c such that if '8 = (A, a,, . . . , a,, g ), then TYPn@l) =TYP"@) and $23 admits c.
Proof. In the case card(A) s M(n, m) we take f = g, D =A and fE = f. The other elements of the code are determined in a natural way.
Assume now card(A) > M(n, m). We consider all basic l-types on the set {al, . . . , a,,,} realized in 5X. For each such l-type we choose as many elements realizing it as possible, up to maximum n. Moreover, with each chosen element we choose also all 'associated' elements. For example, if the chosen element a realizes a 1-typep such that f3, EP, then we also choose elements b2, . . . , b, such that tV'(a, bZ, . . . , b,) = t. The procedure of choosing goes step by step. First we choose elements realizing trivial and subtrivial l-types. Then we choose elements realizing cycles. Finally, we choose elements which realize other l-types. Let DO denote the set of elements chosen in such a way. Now for 1 G n we consider sets BI = {a E DO: f'(a) E Do} and C, = {a E Do: f (a) $ Do and for some k < I, f"(a) = f'(a)} and for each a E B, U C, we extend DO by adding elements
f(a), . . . , f'-'(a).
We repeat this as many times as possible. Let D be the set which arises in this way. The function g on the set D tl f -l(D) will coincide with f. We have to define the function g on the other elements. First assume that D is closed under the function f. We will consider some cases. If pi is an r-cycle for some r s n, then we define f on Ai in such a way that for all a E Ai, {f'(a): I > 0} has exactly r elements. By $i this is possible. Finally, if pi is a simple l-type and Ai is infinite, then we define f such that its graph is a disjoint union of infinite chains. In the case Ai is finite we define f such that for arbitrary a E Ai, {f'(u): 1 s hi} = Ai. This finishes the definition off.
To show that '8 admits c we define E in a natural way (i. where @ is a sentence and q(x) is a formula of the language of arithmetic with addition. Proof. We will show that each sentence is effectively equivalent to some boolean combination of basic sentences. We construct it by elimination of quantifiers. It is enough to show that if $ is a boolean combination of atomic formulas and basic sentences, then the formula Fnx, . . . x,y, . . * y, C#J is equivalent to some boolean combination of atomic formulas and basic sentences. We can assume that # has the form Vi Aj $i, where each Gij is an atomic formula or negation of an atomic formula or a basic sentence.
In a standard way (see Krynicki The last two results allow us to give a partial answer to the question stated in Krynicki-Vaananen [lo] . Namely, by Corollary 1 and Theorem 1 we have:
is not recursively semantically equivalent to L*.
Finally we can deduce the following result implicitly contained in KrynickiVaananen [lo] . From the proof of the main theorem we can also deduce the following corollary. In this section we extend some results of Krynicki-Lachlan [9] concerning decidability and undecidability of theories in L(H). In that paper it was proved that the theory of unary relations is decidable in L(H). On the other hand the theory of successor functions is undecidable in L(F,). The proof of this fact is based on the observation that in (w, s), where s is the usual successor function, we can define addition and multiplication. This allows us also to prove the following lemma, suggested by A.H. Lachlan: Proof. Let C#I be a formula satisfying the assumptions of the lemma. We define:
U(x) iff (2: c+(z, x)} is finite, R(x, y) iff card{z: c$(z, x)} = card{z: +(z, y)}, S(x, y) iff card{z: $(z, x)} < card{z: c$(z, y)}.
Notice that U(x) is expressible in L(F,) (this can be done by means of the Ehrenfeucht sentence restricted to a proper formula). R(x, y) and S(x, y) are also expressible in L(F,) (see, e.g., ). We denote by o the sentence 3x U(x) A Vx 3y (U(x) + U(y) A S(x, y)), and T' = T U {a}. By our assumption T' is consistent. Moreover, if % is a model for T', then we have (U"/R'", S"'/R"') = (0, <). N ow, as in Krynicki-Lachlan [9, Lemma 3.21, we can show that addition and multiplication are categorically definable. Thus T' and consequently T is undecidable in L(F,). 0 Proof. We apply Lemma 14 using the formula y = f (x) in the first case, "x is an atom and x G y" in the second case, and 0 < x A x < y in the last two cases. 0
Some results from the last corollary can be obtained using the undecidability of the considered theories in the language with the Hartig quantifier (see Herre et al. [7] ).
Group theory
Now we consider the theory of groups. First we define the following formula: (a, b) . Then there is a function f : G+ G such that f (0) = 0, and for every g E G, f (g + b) = f (g) + b. Thus for every n E Z, f (nb) = nb. But f (a) # a so there is no n E Z such that a = nb.
(3) Let us assume that a # nb for any n E Z. We define f : G += G step by step in the following way. First we put f (nb) = nb for all n E Z. Now let f be defined on H being the proper subset of G such that for all x E H and n E Z, x + nb E H. Now let x E G -H. We extend f by putting f (x + nb) = nb for each n E 72. This Proof. Let T be a theory satisfying the assumptions of the theorem. Let T' = T U { 3y 0,x (x, y)} , where Q, is the quantifier 'there exist infinitely many' and @ is the formula defined before Lemma 15. Thus T' is consistent.
Let c be a new constant and let T, = T' U {Q-x $(x, c)}. We define:
S(x,y)=y=x+c,
+(V=U+CVV+C=U))A(V=Z+(U#tVU=0))A(U=XjV=U+C)).
By our assumptions U(x) and S(x, y) define a structure isomorphic to the integers with successor function.
U'(x) is satisfied if U(x) and there is a one-one function f such that f (0) = 0, f oranyy#Ofrom Ueitherf(y)=y+corf(y)=y-c, for no y # 0 f(y) = y, and moreover f(x) = x + c. Therefore U+ defines the positive part of U. Hence in any model for T,, U+(x) and S(x, y) define a system isomorphic to (w, s). Thus T, and consequently T are undecidable. 0
The last theorem gives us many examples of undecidable theories in L(F,): the theory of abelian groups, the theory of cyclic groups, the theory of free torsion groups etc.
Let us turn to the case of the theory of groups with all elements of finite order. Here we can prove the following:
Theorem 9. Every theory of groups having a model with elements of arbitrary large finite order is undecidable in L( F2).
Proof. Using the formula $(x, y) we can define the relation "the order of an element . . . is less than the order of an element . . ." between elements of finite order. This allows us to interpret (w, <) in a model of our theory. 0
In Baudisch [l] it was proved that the theory of p-adic groups in the language with the Hlrtig quantifier is decidable.
In spite of this we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 8. The theory of p-adic groups is undecidable in L(F,).
The theory of fields
The same method as in the case of the theory of groups can be applied to many theories of fields. Let o, be the formula 0,x $(x, 1) and o2 the formula VX 3y ($(y, 1) &X < y) where C$ is the formula defined before Lemma 15. It remains to define the translation.
We assume that Q$x,, . . . , x,) is a boolean combination of atomic formulas: xi = Xi, xi = 0, xi = s(xj), xi = xi + xk, xi = xi . xk.
We can obtain a formula satisfying this assumption in an effective way from @ increasing eventually the number of existential quantifiers. Then we define the translation for atomic formulas. We shall give a translation into second-order logic, keeping in mind that all second-order quantifiers can be eliminated in favour of F$. Let L3: (@(x, jj), $(x, 2)) be the abbreviation of the following 
Final remarks
In this part we would like to discuss some unsolved problems and list some open questions.
1. We have proved that the theory of identity in L(H,) is undecidable. It implies that this theory in a language with all Henkin quantifiers L" is also undecidable, but we do not know if the language with all Henkin quantifiers is semantically more powerful than that of L(H,), that is if L* # L(H,). It seems that L(H,) is essentially weaker than L". However there are Henkin quantifiers which seem to be weaker than those of the form H,, they are V* . . v3 v3 * * .3
V3
and El 2. All undecidability results for the theory of identity stated in this paper, particularly for L(H,), essentially use the fact that the considered class of quantifiers are infinite. This does not exclude the possibility that the theory of identity in L(H,) is decidable for all 12 (for n = 2 this was proved in [9]). If for some 12 the theory of identity in L(H,) is undecidable, then there is the question of the minimal II with this property. A relevant result about unprovability of decidability of the theory of identity in L(Q), has been stated in [13] , but it is not obvious how to conclude just undecidability from that.
3. Let u be a signature with infinitely many unary predicates. We know that L,(H) is decidable, but L,(H,) and L,(Fz) are undecidable. What about Lo(H3)? What is the situation if (T were finite? And finally, is L,(F,) decidable?
4. For languages as powerful as the language with all Henkin quantifiers the borderline between axiomatizable (recursively enumerable) and not axiomatizable seems to be more interesting than that between decidable and undecidable.
In [14] , it was stated that for every recursive set of Henkin quantifiers A if the theory of identity in L(A) is axiomatizable, then it is decidable. Does the same hold for every signature? For a signature o with at least one binary predicate or one unary function symbol L,(H) is not recursively enumerable because full elementary arithmetic can be interpreted in L,(H) (see [9] ). We know that every nonlinear Henkin quantifier has to contain H, therefore the problem is reduced to the question: are there any decidable classes of Henkin quantifiers A such that the theory of unary relations in L(A) is recursively enumerable but undecidable?
